China’s Climate Policy Crossroads as the Next Five-Year Plan Takes Shape

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Urban view of Chengdu reflecting China’s five-year plan and climate governance goals.

How the 15th Five-Year Plan will Determine China’s Climate Trajectory and Emissions Outcomes

China’s next five-year plan for 2026–30 — the 15th such plan — is shaping up to be one of the most consequential policy documents for the country’s climate policy in decades. It will effectively define the pace of renewable energy deployment, carbon intensity trajectories, fossil fuel demand peaks, and key sectors’ contributions to greenhouse gas emissions reduction.

The Role of Five-Year Plans in Coordinating National Climate and Energy Policy

Five-year plans in China are not merely broad aspirational documents: they are policy blueprints that influence decisions by government agencies, state-owned enterprises, regional authorities and financial institutions. These plans set quantified targets, guide investment priorities, and align planning across multiple industrial and economic sectors.
The upcoming plan will cover climate, energy, industrial transformation, and infrastructure — and it will be followed by hundreds of subordinate sectoral plans (for electricity, renewables, carbon peaking, and industry). Provinces tailor these targets into localized action plans, making the central strategy a powerful lever for on-the-ground change.
The central question is whether the plan will reinforce China’s 2030 Paris commitments — which include reducing carbon intensity — or fall short amid competing growth priorities.

Why Setting Targets Tied to the Paris Agreement will Test China’s Climate Commitments

China has pledged to reduce carbon intensity — a measure of emissions per unit of GDP — by 65% from 2005 levels by 2030. However, progress toward this goal has slowed, with recent slowdowns linked to post-pandemic energy consumption patterns and coal-heavy industrial activity. The next five-year plan is likely to revisit carbon-intensity targets and determine whether emissions should fall in absolute terms during the 2026–2030 period.
To meet Paris targets, China would need to reduce energy sector CO₂ emissions while maintaining economic growth. This is a delicate balance: if the plan only promises gradual improvements, emissions could rebound early in the period — undermining long-term climate ambitions.

What Clean Energy and Carbon Intensity Targets China’s Next Five-Year Plan Must Address

The Challenge of Aligning Clean Energy Expansion with Carbon Intensity Reduction Goals

China’s clean energy sector has been a growth engine, with wind and solar deployment repeatedly exceeding official targets. Yet the next five-year plan must address how clean energy growth will align with carbon intensity and non-fossil fuel share goals.
The current share of non-fossil energy — expected to reach roughly 25% by 2030 — must expand more rapidly if China is to achieve deeper carbon intensity cuts without stalling economic growth. Analysts estimate that reaching a share of roughly 30% non-fossil energy by 2030 would be necessary if energy demand growth remains moderate.
Non-fossil expansion hinges on wind and solar scalability. These technologies can be deployed quickly compared to nuclear or hydropower, yet meeting the more ambitious share will require 250–350 GW of new wind and solar additions per year — a step up from official targets.
This isn’t purely a technical question: it’s political. Local governments often prioritise GDP growth and job creation — traditionally coal-linked outcomes — over rapid structural change. The five-year plan must signal a shift toward renewables as economic drivers, not just climate instruments.

Can China Set an Absolute Cap on Coal Consumption and Shift Energy Growth Patterns?

President Xi has pledged that coal consumption will “gradually reduce” during the next five-year period, but whether this translates into an absolute cap below 2025 levels is still a matter of debate.
If the plan were to include an absolute decline in coal use starting early in the period (such as by 2027–28), it would signal a firmer commitment to decarbonisation. State media and research bodies have suggested a potential coal peak around 2027–28, although industry stakeholders advocate later timelines.
This decision has global implications. China remains the largest consumer of coal in the world, and setting a clear cap would contribute substantially to slowing cumulative emissions growth — an essential goal for keeping warming below 1.5 °C.

How ‘Dual Control’ of Carbon could Prevent an Emissions Rebound and Shape Implementation

What Dual Control of Carbon Intensity and Absolute Emissions Means in Practice

The concept of dual control of carbon refers to simultaneously managing carbon intensity (emissions per unit GDP) and absolute emissions. This dual approach is seen as necessary to prevent the so-called “storming the peak” — where emissions spike early in a plan because actors expect later tightening.
Local governments, if left without robust carbon controls, might be incentivised to increase emissions early in the plan period to lock in higher baselines before stringent caps take effect. By expressly embedding dual control mechanisms, central authorities can reduce this perverse incentive and smooth emissions pathways.
Yet this system has not yet been fully operationalised: policy documents suggest building the system during the plan period, not necessarily starting it with firm metrics in 2026.

The Importance of Absolute Emissions Caps for Major Emitting Industries in China

A key component of effective dual control is setting absolute emissions caps for major emitting sectors — something the State Council has said will begin in certain industries by 2027 under the national carbon market.
This sectoral approach could be a stepping stone to economy-wide caps, but only if complemented by comprehensive metrics, monitoring systems, and enforcement mechanisms. Without clear enforcement or universal coverage, dual-control ambitions risk becoming symbolic rather than substantive.

Why Limiting Coal-power Expansion and Chemical-Industry Growth is Crucial to China’s Low Carbon Goals

The Tension between Coal-power Capacity Growth and Clean Energy Deployment Targets

During the current five-year period, leadership rhetoric shifted from “strict control” of new coal plants to more active promotion — a move that complicates clean-energy ambitions. The reality is China’s existing pipeline of coal-power capacity could expand significantly before 2030, and many plants under construction risk becoming underutilised in a clean-power world.
While renewables grow rapidly, balancing energy security, grid stability, and industrial demand has kept coal in the mix. Policymakers now face a choice: maintain coal expansion at the expense of emissions goals, or accelerate retirements and grid flexibility to prioritise renewables.

Managing Petrochemical and Coal-based Industrial Expansion while Reducing Emissions

Beyond power, the chemical industry — especially coal-to-chemical feedstocks — is a major source of emissions. Over 500 petrochemical projects are planned by 2030, many of which are coal- and oil-based.
This presents a dilemma: these projects reduce reliance on imported fuels but lock in high emissions if alternatives aren’t adopted. Shifting capacity toward electrification or low-carbon feedstocks, and ensuring their energy sources are renewable, will be necessary to align chemical-industry growth with climate commitments.

How Mid-level Bureaucrats and Local Policymakers are Shaping Chinese Climate Policy on the Ground

Why City-level Innovation and Bureaucratic Agency Matter for Climate Policy Implementation

Although climate policy in China is often viewed as centrally directed, recent research highlights the importance of mid-level bureaucrats and city governments in shaping how climate goals are translated into action.
Mid-level officials — sometimes called “bridge leaders” — can innovate at the local level, form coalitions, influence higher authorities, and adapt national targets to local realities. Cities like Shenzhen, Zhenjiang, Xiamen, and Nanchang have shown how subnational agencies can experiment with policy instruments and regulatory standards, contributing to broader climate governance frameworks.
In some cities, dedicated low-carbon agencies have helped institutionalise climate action, improving enforcement, building local capacity, and attracting external investment — proving that local initiative can amplify national ambitions.

The Role of Local Data, Institutional Capacity and Pilot Programmes in Scaling Low-Carbon Solutions

Effective local climate policy hinges on robust data systems, cross-agency cooperation, and sustained institutional support. Many cities still lack comprehensive carbon accounting systems — a barrier to accurate tracking and targeted interventions.
Pilot programmes, including emissions trading schemes, climate finance innovations, and urban sustainability projects, serve as testbeds. Successful pilots provide evidence that can inform national strategies — but inconsistent data sharing and limited resources can constrain their impact.

Institutional, Economic and Political Challenges to Implementing Ambitious Climate Targets

Structural Incentives and Resistance in Intergovernmental Climate Policy Processes

China’s governance structure combines central policy direction with local implementation. This multi-level system can generate innovation but also resistance. Provincial interests tied to energy, jobs, and industrial capacity may slow climate actions if incentives are misaligned. Effective five-year plan design must balance these political and economic incentives to ensure implementation fidelity.

Data Gaps, Monitoring Systems and Financing Barriers at Provincial and City Levels

Climate action relies on accurate data — for emissions, energy use, and economic impacts. Many local agencies lack access to comprehensive datasets, limiting their ability to design, monitor, and enforce climate policies. Strengthening data infrastructure and transparency is critical.
Public finance remains the dominant source for adaptation and mitigation investments, but private capital must be mobilised to achieve scale. Clear policy signals, investment incentives, and robust monitoring frameworks will be key to unlocking broader financing.

 

The Bottom Line
China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan stands at a critical juncture. The decisions taken now — on carbon intensity targets, clean energy expansion, coal consumption limits, and behavioural mechanisms such as dual control of carbon — will shape China’s emissions trajectory and its contribution to global climate goals well into the next decade.
Furthermore, the emerging role of mid-level bureaucrats and local experimenters underscores that climate policy is not only about targets on paper but about implementation in practice.
Past wind and solar targets have often been exceeded, hinting that a higher ambition in the new plan could be realised if political will and administrative support align. Whether China chooses to deepen its clean-energy transition and restrain fossil fuel and chemical-industry growth — or treads a more cautious path — will define its climate legacy in the 2030s.

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